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Abstract 
Many countries provide transfers for particular client groups such as children and 
often such transfers are in-kind rather than cash. However, this may, at least 
partially, crowd out private expenditures on the goods in question because they 
reduce the incentive for other individuals, like parents, to make altruistic transfers. 
They are often made to one household member on behalf of another so there may 
also be agency concerns: the recipient may divert some of the transfer away from 
the intended beneficiary.  
This paper throws light on these issues using three nutrition programs for children in 
UK households: free lunch at school for children from poor households; free milk to 
poor households with pre-school children; and free milk at day-care for pre-school 
children in attendance regardless of parental income.  
We provide difference in difference estimates based on a welfare reform and on 
variation in the timing of school holidays. These estimates are broadly consistent 
with estimates of a structural model that is identified using the same welfare reform. 
This gives us confidence in the interpretation of our estimates that the structural 
model provides but the simple difference-in-difference cannot. 
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1.   Introduction 
In-kind transfers are often regarded as weakly inferior to cash transfers because 
the cash could always be used to replicate any in-kind transfer of the same value. As a 
result, in-kind transfer policies are often thought to have paternalistic motivations – 
for example, to promote good health.
1 A recent example in the UK is “Healthy Start” 
program which provides vouchers, to certain low income households with children, 
which can be exchanged for milk, fruit and vegetables. Many such programs exist 
elsewhere.  Such transfer  programs  are often administratively expensive relative to 
cash transfer programs. They are often provided through some agent – for example, to 
a parent on behalf of a child. The agent may be able to divert some of the transfer 
away from the intended beneficiary.  Moreover,  children  are  usually  altruistically 
linked to their parents, and this altruism may lead to internal household redistributions 
that, to some extent, undo the effects of the external transfers. That is, a parent who 
feels altruistic towards a child will increase (decrease) internal transfers to the child in 
the face of smaller (larger) external transfers to the child.
2
This paper measures the extent to which altruism between parents and their 
dependent children could undermine the objectives of policy. We also consider to 
what degree  transfers are affected by  agency considerations  regarding which 
household member receives a transfer. We do so with the help of changes to three UK 
  
 
1 Currie and Gahvari (2008) review the evidence behind alternative arguments for in-kind transfers.  
2 See Bergstrom (1989) for a review of the “rotten kid” theorem that lies behind such behaviour, and 
see Jacoby (2002) which refers to the absence of altruism as generating a “flypaper” effect because the 
transfer sticks where it lands. Gruber and Hungerman (2007) demonstrates crowding out of chaitable 
giving by New Deal spending during the Great Depression, while Hungerman (2009) suggests that the 
degree of crowding out, also in the context of transfer to communities, is affected by diversity.   2 
nutrition programs: Free School Lunches for the children of poor households who 
attend  school; Welfare Milk Tokens  which can be exchanged for milk  and are 
available for poor households with pre-school children; and Day Care Milk for pre-
school  children,  regardless of family circumstances,  while attending registered 
childcare institutions. These programs can be informative on these two issues because 
of their differences. It seems likely that free milk is a good substitute for the privately 
purchased alternative; while school lunches may be a poor substitute for market food. 
Moreover, while Welfare Milk Tokens and Day Care Milk both provide milk, they are 
delivered differently. The former is a transfer to the mother, while the latter is given 
directly to the child at the institution where we would not expect there to be any 
agency issue.  
Importantly, two of these programs were reformed in 1988: after the  reform 
only poor parents receiving in-work welfare benefits were eligible for Welfare Milk 
Tokens and Free School Lunches, whereas previously eligibility was for low income 
families who were on either in-work or out-of-work welfare. Day Care Milk continued 
to be provided regardless of circumstances. 
Evidence that nutrition programs  significantly  crowd out private  food 
expenditure would provide support to the proponents of cashing-out such transfers 
since typically in-kind programs are more expensive to administer than cash transfers. 
The question is of more general interest since altruism undermines the effectiveness of 
public transfers whether they are cash or in-kind. There are two related questions here. 
First, providing cash or a good with close market substitutes (like milk) rather than a 
good with poor market substitutes (like school lunch) may allow the parents to alter 
market expenditure patterns to divert some of the benefit to others in the household.   3 
Second,  there may be different effects from giving milk in day care,  where the 
authorities can ensure a child gets it, rather than giving milk to the household, where it 
may be consumed by any household member. We think of differences in the former 
(goods with different substitutabilities) as revealing altruism and differences in the 
latter (different delivery of the same good) as suggestive of agency.  
Our results have general relevance for the design of in-kind transfer programs. 
Altruism considerations suggest that the closer a transfer is to products available in the 
market  the less effective the transfer will be. Thus, if these considerations are 
important then we might expect that the recent extension of the welfare milk program 
in the UK to cover fruit and vegetables will have little of its intended effect on the 
nutrition standards of children in low income households. Agency considerations may 
affect how in-kind transfers should be provided, as well as whether they should be. 
While much of the US food stamp research
3
 
3 In addition to Jacoby (2002), which relates to a nutrition program in the Philippines, there is a variety 
of US work that bears on the effectiveness of nutrition programs. A number of such papers consider the 
impact of food stamps on food spending. For example, Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2009), exploit the 
introduction of the Food Stamp program across US counties in a difference-in-differences design, to 
show effects on household food spending that exceed the effect that income transfers of the same value 
would have had. Currie (1997) shows that a US school lunch program is subject to an offsetting 
nutrition reduction of about 50%, while a school breakfast program is relatively effective with only 
modest nutritional offsets. Bhattacharya  et al  (2006) noted  that the school breakfast program had 
nutritional benefits for the recipient child,  but only modest effects on other household members.  
Schanzenbach (2009) suggests that school lunches are one cause of obesity but does not consider other 
household members. Millimet et al (2009) confirm that the breakfast program does not increase obesity 
but that the lunch program does. They also do not consider other household members. 
  has been concerned with 
establishing the value of such transfers to recipient households or communities, here 
we are concerned with the implications of the individualistic nature of transfers to 
uncover the extent of altruism.  We know of no work so far that considers the power 
of agency problems in mitigating in-kind transfer effectiveness more directly, through   4 
household spending patterns. We examine only the effects of transferring private 
goods (milk and food) on household expenditures which we think of as a more direct 
way of testing for  altruism.  Thus, our work serves as a complement to existing 
research on the effects of transfers to communities and the effects of transfers on child 
outcomes (for example health and test scores
4
The UK has no food stamps, but does have two programs that provide free 
milk, which we think of as being close to cash because all households consume milk 
and milk is the same regardless of whether it is free or purchased. The UK also has a 
further program that provides Free School Lunches, similar to the US free lunch and 
breakfast programs. We exploit a reform that occurred in 1988 which changed the 
eligibility conditions for Free School Lunches and Welfare Milk Tokens, but not for 
Day  Care  Milk.  Furthermore, we  use  the fact that Free School Lunches are only 
available during term time and that school summer holidays in Scotland are a month 
earlier than the rest in the UK. We combine these features to form natural experiments 
to identify the role of altruism by considering the reformed programs separately. 
However, we have no experimental variation in the Day Care Milk program and so we 
incorporate  this, together with the other two  programs, by estimating  a structural 
model to also test for agency.  This  second strategy controls,  parametrically, for 
observed differences between the treatment and control groups and makes 
assumptions about the distribution of unobservables to facilitate identification. In the 
structural model we also exploit the welfare reform to provide exogenous variation in 
). 
 
4 See Currie (1997) and references therein for evidence that relates to in-kind transfers arising from 
housing programs and health insurance. See also Browning (1992) who looks at anthropometric effects 
in developing countries.   5 
program eligibility and levels of entitlement. That is, although Day Care Milk was not 
reformed, it has a target group of children of a similar age to Welfare Milk Tokens 
and it is just milk that is the ultimate object of each of the transfer programs.  
The extent to which a nutrition program is close to cash, in the sense of having 
close  market  substitutes,  and how large  provision is,  relative to needs,  are  both 
important determinants of the scope for agency. Welfare Milk Tokens and Day Care 
Milk have good market substitutes, and the tokens provide a large proportion of (mean 
non-eligible household milk) expenditure whereas Day Care Milk provides only a 
small proportion.  
To anticipate our results, we find that both of the milk programs crowd out 
private milk expenditure to a similar degree - by about 80% of their value; whereas 
Free School Lunches, which we think of as poor substitutes for products available in 
the marketplace, are estimated to crowd out private food expenditure - by only 15% of 
their value.  We  infer  that agency problems are small from our finding  that milk 
transfers have a similar crowd out regardless of the delivery mechanism: whether via 
the child’s day-care institution or via a welfare-eligible mother. Furthermore, milk 
transfers appear to have similar crowd-out effects regardless of the size of provision 
relative to needs. Our results show that altruism is relatively more important than 
agency in this context. 
2.   Cash and In-kind Transfer Programs in the UK 
In-kind transfers in the UK are largely nutrition programs for households with 
children: Free School Lunches, Welfare Milk Tokens and Day Care Milk.    The   6 
exceptions are the (near-cash) Housing Benefit
5
The main UK  cash programs  during the 1980’s and 1990’s were Income 
Support and Family Credit.
 program and (universal) healthcare 
provision, In addition to these in-kind transfers, several means-tested cash transfer 
programs provide benefits for households who have low income and assets.  
6
Free School Lunches had been available each school day to children attending 
school where a member of the household was receiving either of the cash transfers, 
 Income Support is a cash transfer which is available to 
households where income is  below a “needs” threshold  and  financial assets are 
sufficiently low. Needs are a function of household demographic characteristics, and 
entitlement is the amount that income falls below the needs level. Eligibility is subject 
to a maximum weekly hours of work. Income Support is essentially an out-of-work 
cash transfer program, similar to AFDC in the US. Family Credit is a cash transfer to 
low income working households with dependent children. Entitlement is a proportion 
of the difference between needs and income, subject to a maximum entitlement. 
Needs  in the FC program depend on  household  demographic characteristics 
(differently from that used for Income Support eligibility), and entitlement is subject 
to a  minimum  weekly hours of work which at least one household member must 
satisfy.  Family Credit is paid incrementally throughout the year  unlike its US 
equivalent, EITC. Approximately half of all Family Credit is paid to lone parents. 
 
5 For most recipients, Housing Benefit is a cash transfer but for a small number living in social housing 
the payment is retained by the local authority who provides the housing. 
6 Prior to 1988 Family Credit was called Family Income Supplement and Income Support was called 
Supplementary Benefit. In 1999 Family Credit was replaced by Working Families Tax Credit and in 
2003 by Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit. Income Support became Job Seeker’s Allowance. 
While there are important administrative differences, the new benefits are essentially more generous 
versions of their predecessors. We use the terminology Family Credit and Income Support throughout.   7 
Income Support or Family Credit. Welfare milk was provided in the form of vouchers 
to the parent(s) that could be exchanged for milk at many stores. Finally, Day Care 
Milk has always been independent of cash welfare receipt, is not means-tested in any 
way, and is simply contingent on attending a registered day-care institution.  
The system was reformed in April 1988, but retained a broadly similar 
structure. The central features of the reform were: Family Credit became more 
generous so that eligibility moved higher up the income distribution, but  Family 
Credit  ceased to provide eligibility  for  the  two nutrition programs –  Free School 
Lunches and Welfare Milk Tokens. Although Family Credit cash entitlements were 
increased in 1988, this was not an exact cash-out of the in-kind transfer, since families 
with children attending school received different increases depending on the age of 
child. Daycare milk was not affected by the reform. 
Free School Lunches and Welfare Milk Tokens are extensive (1997 caseloads 
were 1.0  million children  receiving  Free  School  Lunches, 0.2 million  pre-school 
children  in households  receiving  Welfare  Milk  Tokens)  and expensive (respective 
annual costs of £150 million and £47 million).  In 1984 (1992) 15.9% (14.0%) of all 
pupils received Free School Lunches (see Department of Social Security (1995)) and 
the average daily charge for a school lunch was £0.55 (£1.00) in 1992 prices. The 
same school lunch could be bought by children from families ineligible for the waiver, 
so we observe the price of a school lunch in our data. There seems to be very little 
cross-section variation in price. All children have the option of not participating in the 
lunch provided by the school. Instead they may bring a packed lunch from home (for 
which no subsidies were available), or they may return home for lunch, or they may go 
without lunch. Households receiving Free School Lunches in our data received 9.6   8 
lunches  per week on average  and their average real costs (in 1992) were 
approximately £1 each. Thus, the market value of the Free School Lunches received 
by an average recipient household is close to £10 per week, compared to an average 
weekly food expenditure by entitled  (non-entitled)  households with school-aged 
children of £44.21 (£65.68) in our data.  
Welfare Milk Tokens were available to households with a child aged 0-4, 
where one member of the household is receiving Income Support or Family Credit. 
Again, households receiving Family Credit were no longer entitled to Welfare Milk 
Tokens after April 1988. Although the transfer is not explicitly for children, the level 
of entitlement is fixed at one Welfare Milk Token per day for each child aged 0-4 in 
the household. A token could be exchanged for one pint (0.56 litres) of milk at many 
grocery stores. 16.6% of households with pre-school aged children received Welfare 
Milk Tokens in 1987. The market value of the average weekly transfer was £2.98 for 
9.0 pints, compared with average weekly milk expenditure of recipient (non-recipient) 
households with young children of £2.80 (£4.28). The real price of milk has been 
rising over time relative to the overall price index and the food price index. In 1992 a 
pint of milk cost £0.33 on average.  Day Care Milk is available to all registered 
childcare facilities and is distributed to all children irrespective of parental income. 
Children receive 1/3
rd of a pint each day they attend. 
3.  Family Expenditure Survey Data 
The Family Expenditure Surveys  (FES)  are  stratified random samples  of 
approximately seven thousand responding households each year. They are conducted 
continuously over time in Great Britain and collect expenditure information in fine 
detail, together with information about household characteristics, and income levels   9 
by source. The food expenditure data is thought to be particularly accurate since it is 
collected through detailed diary records kept by all spenders.
7
The  Family Expenditure Surveys have been  one of the main vehicles  for 
expenditure, tax and social security policy analysis in the UK (see Johnson, Stark and 
Webb (1990)) since they contain details of welfare receipts (including in-kind 
transfers) and tax payments as well as sufficient information to derive reasonably 
accurate estimates of tax liabilities and welfare entitlements.
 The data that we have 
access to is aggregated to the household level and averaged over the two diary weeks.   
8 The data used here is 
obtained by pooling the 1981 to 1992 surveys to give 29,222 households containing 
either dependent school-age children or pre-school children or  both  (excluding 
multiple-family households). Data prior to 1981 cannot be used because free school 
lunch receipt was not recorded, and data post 1992 cannot be used because there is no 
longer sufficient detail to compute welfare entitlements from the data  available 
because of a local taxation reform.
9
Table 1 shows the characteristics of the households in the data broken down by 
whether the household was surveyed pre- or post-reform and by cash program receipt. 
Income  Support recipients (denoted IS>0) and  Family  Credit  recipients  (denoted 
FC>0) are much poorer, and much more likely to be lone parent households, than the 
group who received neither program  (denoted  IS=FC=0).  For the Income Support 
 
 
7 See Kelmsley et al (1980) for details of sampling methods. See Atkinson and Micklewright (1983) on 
the reliability of income data in the FES. Tanner (1998) provides checks on the reliability of 
expenditures data. 
8 We compute entitlements on the basis of recorded incomes, children, etc. using a very detailed routine 
based on the Institute for Fiscal Studies' TAXBEN program. See Giles and McCrae (1995).  
9 See Appendix for the details of the questions and interview instructions.   10 
group, households became smaller post reform, largely because of the growth in the 
number of lone parents on out-of-work welfare.  
The data shows small numbers who receive but who are not apparently eligible 
– just 2% of the IS=FC=0 group receive Free School Lunches or Welfare Milk Tokens 
pre-reform and just 1% post-reform.
10
Pre-reform Family Credit had a run-on period of up to 12 months because of 
the rule that any changes in household circumstances during the year were ignored. If 
the change in receipt  had been instantaneous following a change in eligibility we 
would expect the figure for Family Credit recipients in 1988 to be approximately one 
quarter of the 1987 level (the reform occurred in April 1988). In fact, the proportion is 
almost one-half in the case of Free School Lunches and just over one-third in the case 
 More serious is that 9% of the Family Credit 
recipient group post-reform receives Free School Lunches and 4% are in receipt of 
Welfare Milk Tokens. Post-reform these households should be ineligible and it seems 
likely that this would have arisen because Family Credit recipients just prior to the 
reform could continue to receive the associated in-kind transfers for up to 12 months. 
This is confirmed in Figure 1 which shows the proportions of households with any 
school age children who are recorded as being in receipt of Free School Lunches. 
Similarly, Figure 2 shows the proportion of households with a pre-school child who 
were in receipt of Welfare Milk Tokens. Neither Figure 1 nor Figure 2 suggests any 
important time series trends.  
 
10 One difficulty with the data is that once Family Credit entitlement is established it can then last for up 
to 6 months (12 months prior to the reform). Indeed, it was the practice of some schools to provide Free 
School Lunches for a whole school year so that those in receipt of Family Credit or Income Support, at 
the beginning of the school year, may have still been receiving them more than nine months later, at the 
end of the year, even though they were no longer eligible on current circumstances.     11 
of Welfare Milk Tokens. This is consistent with there being a substantial lag between 
implementation of the policy change and actual receipt of the associated cash transfer 
program – a lag that lasts through to 1989 for cases establishing a claim in the first 
quarter of 1988. The administrative lags in the welfare system are exacerbated by the 
delivery mechanisms for Free School Lunches, which were typically awarded for a 
school term in advance, and for Welfare Milk Tokens, which were typically made 
available a month in advance.  However, after 1989 the proportion of the Family 
Credit recipients receiving Free School Lunches is reassuringly small. This is small 
enough to be consistent with Free School Lunch receipt amongst Family Credit 
recipients arising from previous eligibility  to Income Support  -  because many 
households who were unemployed will have found low paying work and may move 
from Income Support to Family Credit and still receive the nutrition transfers for a 
period.  Thus, apart from the immediate aftermath of the policy change, the reform 
seems to have clean effects.
11




11 Indeed, we do not require that there be no measurement error. In the difference-in-difference analysis 
we are, in any event, estimating an intention-to-treat so the presence of non-compliers are not 
problematic. And in the case of our structural analysis we are implicitly estimating a local average 
treatment effect, i.e. the effects of losing nutrition receipt due to the reform, not the effects of losing 
nutrition receipt per se.  
  for 
relevant groups of the population of households with children pre and post reform.  
Real milk spending fell dramatically -  by 38% for the IS=FC=0 group reflecting 
changing tastes and falling real prices.  The fall for the Income Support recipients, 
who retained their eligibility to Welfare Milk Tokens, was a similar order of 
12 Food includes meals consumed away from home and non-alcoholic drinks except milk. Milk is all 
forms of liquid milk.   12 
magnitude – down 32%.  In contrast, the group that lost their eligibility to Welfare 
Milk Tokens (FC>0 and only 0-4 aged children) showed significant rises in milk 
spending – up 69%.  Note that households receiving Income Support are on average 
slightly poorer than households receiving Family Credit, who are on average 
considerably poorer than those receiving neither. Thus a comparison  between the 
Income Support and Family Credit recipients illuminates the effect of losing Free 
School Lunches and Welfare Milk Tokens across two groups of low income 
households.
13
Table  3  illustrates the consequences of the April 1988 benefit reform for 
eligibility to the relevant cash transfer programs. Of households with only children 
aged 0-4 (only 5-15), 2.6% (3.9%) lost their Family Credit-based eligibility to Welfare 
Milk Tokens (Free School Lunches), and of households with children in both age 
groups 5.4% lost their Family Credit-based eligibility to both programs.
  
14
Figures  3a and 3b  show the budget shares of milk and non-milk food, 
respectively, over time for the three categories of household (IS>0, FC>0, IS=FC=0).  
The only pronounced trend is the decrease in milk share for the IS=FC=0 group 
arising from falling real prices and taste changes. This suggests the non-working poor 
(IS>0) might be a better control group for the working poor (FC>0) because they are 
less subject to differential trends.  Table 4 summarizes the gross features of nutrition 
  
 
13 The decrease in total expenditure for the Income Support recipient group across the reform reflects 
compositional changes: it arises because of the increase in the representation of lone (especially never-
married) parents, who have substantially lower household income, in this category.  
14 Eligibility for Welfare Milk Tokens or Free School Lunches requires household eligibility to an 
associated cash transfer, and children in the relevant age ranges. The importance of the distinction 
between receipt and eligibility groupings is emphasized in the next section.   13 
program eligibility and receipt separately. For Free School Lunches there are just 
2.4% of ineligibles that are in receipt (ineligible participants). The overall 
participation rate for the Free School Lunch program is 58%. Since families in receipt 
of Free School Lunches contained 1.89 school age children and those families not in 
receipt of Free School Lunches contained an average of 1.61 children we estimate that 
12% of households, corresponding to 14% of school children, receive free school 
lunches. Table 4 also highlights similar features for Welfare Milk Tokens and Day 
Care Milk for households with only pre-school age children.
15
4.   Modeling Household Food and Milk Expenditures 
 Table 5 shows the 
number of households receiving multiple nutrition transfers according to eligibility. 
Overall participation by ineligibles (1.7% of observations lie above the diagonal) is a 
rather small proportion of the sample, while eligible non-participants (non-takeup) are 
the much larger group below the diagonal (28.5%). 
Applied demand analysts have come to regard budget shares  as the most 
appropriate way of modelling household spending behaviour (see Pollak and Wales, 
1995). Here, we adopt a specification for budget shares that is widely used in applied 
microeconomic analysis of household spending: one where the budget shares are 
quadratic in log total expenditure.  For the moment, consider the following 
straightforward model of budget shares 
 
15 In the case of Day Care Milk, the question routing prevents us from observing ineligible recipients. 
The larger proportion of ineligible participants in the case of Welfare Milk Tokens is likely to be due to 
our inability to identify expectant mothers currently without pre-school aged children, who would be 
eligible during pregnancy.    14 
(1)    ki i k i ki s ε β γ + + = X T  
where  ski is the budget share for household i on good k = milk, food, the potentially 
endogenous Ti indicates participation in the three nutrition programs for household i, 
Xi  are  observable  controls, and ε ki captures  unobservable  determinants. We are 
seeking to estimate the vectorγ k , the response of expenditure shares to participation 
in each program.   
4.1  Difference in differences using individual micro-data 
Firstly, we use the 1988 reform as a natural experiment, including individual 
control variables to capture observed differences between the treatment and control 
groups and changes in their characteristics over time. The reform only affects Welfare 
Milk Tokens and Free School Lunches and therefore, in this section, we cannot 
investigate the effects of Day Care Milk. Thus, we modify (1) such that 
(2)    . ik i k k i i i k i k ik s RR αε =++ ++ Tδ Tγ Xβ  
where Ri=1(0) if i is observed post(pre)-reform and is included to capture unobserved 
differences between pre and post reform expenditure patterns, the T’s are included to 
capture differences in spending patterns between the eligible and ineligibles arising for 
unobserved reasons, and their interaction captures the effects of the loss of eligibility 
of the programs following the 1988 reform. We include a vector of control variables, 
X, to capture individual specific differences.
16
 
16 While it might be tempting to rely on a simple difference in differences methodology based on data 
grouped by Family Credit eligibility pre and post reform, we are reluctant to do so here. In particular 
we are concerned that, even if we assume that the reform is a clean natural experiment, restrictions on 
preferences are required for the aggregate data to be consistent with consumer theory. In particular, 
 Applying the difference in differences 
   15 
method to the micro-data has the added advantage that it allows us to control for other 
observables that vary across time differently for the treatments and controls, and we 
include  the number and ages of children, lone parent,  income, Family Credit and 
Income Support eligibility, and pre- or post-reform observation.  
The scope of the nutrition programs (milk for households with pre-school 
children, and food for school-aged children), and the nature of the reform (whereby 
just the working poor lost eligibility), suggests a number of possible difference-in-
differences designs. The natural treatment group throughout are those households who 
lost eligibility to the nutrition program (i.e. the working poor). While it is usual for the 
control group to be defined as all those not in the treatment group, here we have three 
candidates for control groups: households who were always eligible (i.e. the non-
working poor); households who were never eligible (i.e. the working non-poor); or, as 
would be more usual, both groups of untreated households. 
The difference-in-difference methodology is well known to require that the 
trends and shocks for treatment and controls are the same. Inspection of Figure 3 
suggests that, although there is a strong trend decrease in the shares for both milk and 
food for the group where FC=IS=0, but the treatment group (FC>0) and what seems 
like our most credible control group (IS>0) seem to exhibit no strong trend changes.  
An important assumption of difference-in-differences is exogenous group 
composition, whereby individuals must not be able to self-select into treatment status. 
 
incomes are changing over time, within the treatment and control groups, and only if changes in the 
distribution  of income (we adopt the usual convention in demand modeling of substituting total 
expenditure for income) did not affect budget shares can we meaningfully aggregate the data into group 
means. This condition would imply that preferences are quasi-homothetic, a restriction that is typically 
rejected in micro-data. See Blundell et al. (1993).   16 
Cash transfer program participation is obviously a choice, and grouping according to 
Family Credit receipt status may be problematic. We could allow for the possibility of 
endogenous group composition by defining intention to treat using  Family Credit 
eligibility rather than receipt. However, grouping by Family Credit eligibility status is 
also questionable because, post-reform, households may have altered behaviour in 
response to the reform, which would change entitlement. Thus, in Table 6 we group 
the data so that the T’s are defined according to pre-reform Family Credit eligibility 
status. That is, entitlement to Family Credit is calculated on the basis of pre-reform 
Family Credit entitlement rules using household observed  characteristics, such as 
income and children. Table 6 reports only the coefficient (denoted γ in the table) on 
the interaction between a post-reform dummy variable, R, and the intention to treat 
(eligibility) dummy variables, the T’s, of equation (2).
17
It is possible to focus on the effect of losing Welfare Milk Token eligibility by 
considering households with only pre-school aged children. Estimates for this sample 




17 We have also estimated both the difference-in-differences dropping April 1988 through March 1989 
which may be considered a phase-in period for the reform. These difference-in-differences results are 
slightly higher but lose precision. We also estimate a structural model below. Here the structural budget 
share estimates are unchanged when we drop the phase-in period. In view of this, and the relatively 
short post-reform observation window, our preferred estimates include data for the phase-in period. 
 The effect of losing Free School 
Lunch eligibility is isolated by just  including  households with only school-aged 
children, presented in the middle three rows. The combined effect of losing eligibility 
to either, or both, nutrition programs uses the full sample and is presented in the last 
three rows. Each row in each block corresponds to a particular control group (non-
18 Results that use receipt rather than eligibility are broadly similar to those presented in Table 6 but 
more precise.   17 
working poor (FCe=0 and ISe>0  where  e  indicates eligibility), working non-poor 
(ISe=0 and FCe=0), or both groups together). The general pattern of results in Table 6 
implies that losing Welfare Milk Token eligibility increases the milk budget share and 
causes some substitution away from non-milk food; while losing Free School Lunches 
causes no significant change in the milk share but a large increase in non-milk food 
share. To understand the implications of these estimated effects note that, for the 
average eligible household, Welfare Milk Tokens were exchanged for about 9 pints 
per week with a market value of approximately £3. The average household receiving 
Free School Lunches had 9.6 per week which were worth approximately £10. Income 
Support recipients are the more natural  control group for the treatment  of losing 
nutrition program eligibility since both IS and FC groups are relatively poor. The 
estimates  corresponding to this definition of control group  suggests that losing 
Welfare Milk Tokens increased the budget share of milk by 0.96. This represents an 
increase in milk expenditure, at the mean for these groups, of approximately £1.80 per 
week and suggests that Welfare Milk Tokens crowded out private milk expenditure by 
slightly more than half of their value. The loss of Welfare Milk Tokens to households 
with young children also affects the share of non-milk  food:  but only by -0.47 
implying a small effect (of -£0.80) because some non-milk food spending is switched 
to milk. The final column shows the overall effect on food and milk aggregated 
together: an increase of approximately £1. 
For households with only school age children, the loss of Free School Lunch 
eligibility leads to an increase in non-milk food share by 2.2%, corresponding to a rise 
in expenditure of about £5. This implies a non-milk food expenditure crowd-out of 
approximately half of the Free School Lunch value.   18 
For Free School Lunches (but not Welfare Milk Tokens or Day Care Milk) 
another difference-in-differences grouping is possible which is not based on the 1988 
reform. Free School Lunches are only available during school term time, and school 
summer holidays in Scotland are approximately one month earlier than the rest of the 
UK.
19 Inspection of the data does indeed confirm that Scotland has different summer 
school holiday timing.
20
Table 7 presents estimates of this Scotland vs. England/Wales school holidays 
difference-in-differences design. The relevant sample contains households with school 
aged children who have an entitlement to Free School Lunches, or would have, at 
some time in the school  year. If the survey interview takes place during school 
holidays, Free School Lunches cannot be provided, despite eligibility, and no 
substitute is available.  Again the table just shows the coefficient on the relevant 
interaction in an equation that controls for time and for region, as well as the same 
controls as used previously. The first line of the table shows, for example, the effect of 
comparing spending in Scotland on schooldays with England and Wales during school 
holidays  at the same time of the year.  These  program  holiday difference-in-
differences, which control for regional and seasonal differences in spending patterns, 
show  that losing Free School Lunches because of school holidays, on average, 
increases food expenditure share relative to school term time: increasing the share on 
average by 0.016 although the effect is not well determined. We should think of this 
  
 
19 Children in private schools typically have longer summer holidays. We do not have data on who 
attends private school but, from other sources, we know that they are only 6% of the school population. 
Households with children in private schools are very unlikely to be eligible for Free School Lunches. 
20 From the pattern of school meals and the survey date observed in the data.   19 
treatment as the effect of losing  approximately 10 lunches per week worth 
approximately £10. Thus a change in the share of 1.6% corresponds to an increase in 
spending on food of approximately £4.70  per week for a typical low income 
household. So, effectively £1 of Free School Lunches displaces approximately £0.40 
of household non-milk  food spending  –  somewhat  smaller than the difference-in-
difference estimate that exploits the 1988 reform, although this estimate is not 
statistically significant.  Of course, implicit in the school holiday difference-in-
differences is the presumption that inter-temporal  substitution in food spending is 
small – in practice there may be changes in the stocks of food in response to the 
anticipated seasonal loss in Free School Meals that that would suggest that our 
estimates in Table 7 would be lower bounds to unanticipated permanent losses. It may 
also true that these estimates are contaminated with a pure holiday effect – that free 
lunch recipients  change their consumption behavior during the holiday period. To 
investigate this, we compare the change in food spending when holidays occur for free 
school lunch eligibles with ineligibles. This differences out any pure holiday effect. 
The result is a 0.016 rise in the share of food for eligibles relative to ineligibles, albeit 
rather imprecisely estimated, which is exactly the difference we get from our estimate 
of the effect of losing Free School Lunches because of school holidays. In other 
words, it seems that holidays do not make a difference, but the loss of a free school 
lunch does. 
4.2  Structural demand system with endogenous nutrition program participation 
Our second method relies on the structural form for preferences embodied in 
equation (1). We also adopt restrictive distributional assumptions in order to estimate 
the determinants of program participation and budget shares. It is important to note   20 
that this structural model provides estimates of the average treatment effect rather than 
the intention to treat parameters that the difference-in-differences method provided.  
The structural approach still allows us to exploit the reform for identification, 
but has the important advantage that it allows us to include Day Care Milk within a 
single coherent framework. Recall that eligibility was unchanged by the reform so we 
were unable to estimate the effect of such transfers  in  a difference-in-differences 
framework.  This  was an important deficiency because the different delivery 
mechanisms for milk are potentially informative about agency. It might be argued that 
daycare milk is synonymous with daycare so that we should not be able to estimate the 
effect of daycare milk on spending patterns separately from the effect of daycare on 
spending. In fact, as Table 4 shows, the proportion of eligibles that receive daycare 
milk is only 19% because much of daycare is unregistered.
21
The importance of non-participation in nutrition  programs  was illustrated 
earlier in Table 4, and this motivates us to consider modeling the endogeneity of 
program receipt in the budget share equations. Using the micro-data allowed us to 
control for observed differences between individuals within each group. However, the 
implicit assumption in the  previous  sub-section is that the treatment is randomly 
assigned conditional on the observed control variables included. That is, there are no 
  The identifying 
assumption that we are making in order to make inferences about agency from the 
effect of daycare milk compared to welfare milk is that registered and unregistered 
daycare has the same effects on spending patterns. 
 
21  Only children in registered daycare facilities are eligible for Day Care Milk. Here we treat all 
children in daycare as potentially eligible because we do not observe whether it is registered or not.   21 
unobserved determinants of program eligibility or participation that are correlated 
with budget shares. It seems possible that unobserved determinants of participation are 
likely to affect budget shares – for example, households with members who dislike 
milk are going to be less likely to participate in the milk programs and will also have a 
lower milk budget share, conditional on participation. 
 In order  to deal with this  potential  endogeneity of eligibility  we  adopt a 
structural approach to the specification of equation (1). Here we impose an explicit 
structure to the way that the X’s affect the shares, and we also allow for endogenous 
program participation  by  assuming that the unobservable determinants of budget 
shares and participation are jointly normally distributed. However, we can continue to 
exploit the reform for identification, since nutrition program eligibility is an important 
determinant of participation, as was shown in Table 4. The structure allows us to test 
for crowd-out and agency by incorporating the relevant features of all of the programs 
within a coherent demand framework. This demand system with endogenous program 
participation is modeled using a multivariate generalization of the Heckman (1979) 
selection model.  Adopting this method has the important  advantage that we can 
incorporate Day Care Milk into the analysis - something that was not possible with 
difference-in-differences because this program was not subject to the 1988, or any 
other, reform. 
Expenditure patterns in the  FES data  have  been the subject of detailed 
modeling by Blundell et al (1993) and Banks et al (1997) which both show that a 
generalization of the Almost Ideal Demand System, which allows for budget shares to 
be quadratic functions of log total expenditure, are strongly preferred to the original 
log linear, Almost-Ideal, specification of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). Moreover,   22 
non-parametric modeling of the nature of Engle curves in this data has been explored 
in Blundell et al (1998) who show that non-(log)-linearity is a strong feature of the 
data, and that a quadratic in log total expenditure provides a good approximation to 
non-parametric Engel curves.
22
(3)   
 Such a specification arises from maximizing a utility 
function, which is of the PIGLOG class (see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980), subject to 
a linear budget constraint. Here, we assume that the milk and non-milk food budget 
shares of household i are given by 
2 ln ln ln ik ik k i k i kj j i k ik
j
s yy p αβ ϑ δ ε = + + + ++ ∑ Tγ  
where the subscript k refers to either milk (m) or non-milk food (f), pk is the respective 
real price, y is real total expenditure,
23
T
 εik is a random disturbance, aik depend on the 
household demographics,  Xi, and the vector  contains dummy variables which 
indicate participation in the transfer programs, p (i.e. Day Care Milk (dcm), Welfare 
Milk Tokens (wmt), and Free School Lunches (fsl)).
24
Our approach to modeling take-up is atheoretical – we are not concerned about 
inference in the take-up equations, we are only concerned to get consistent estimates 
  
 
22 Blundell et al (1998) find that the food Engel curve is close to log linear. Here we disaggregate food 
into milk and the rest and find that the Engel curve for the rest is also approximately log-linear while the 
milk share is strongly quadratic. 
23 Total expenditure here includes housing costs. We control for all of the aspects of the 1988 reforms 
and make appropriate adjustments to Housing Benefit associated with the changes in entitlements for 
the reformed benefits. Results where total expenditure excludes housing costs are similar. 
24  We do not estimate a more fully disaggregated demand system including a breakdown of other 
expenditure items such as alcohol, tobacco, services, transport, etc. To the extent that some of these 
commodity groups are exclusively adult goods (and some even may have negative externalities on child 
development) we might be able to draw some further informal inferences about child welfare were we 
to do more disaggregated modelling. However, since our data is silent on child development issues we 
refrain from further dis-aggregation and confine our attention to agency and altruism effects on food 
expenditure.    23 
of (3).
25 * p
i T   We assume that, if  are latent variables corresponding to observed 
participation, 
p
i T , and 
p
i Z  is a vector of household demographic characteristics which 
includes transfer entitlements,
p
i E , and 
p
i η  are respective random disturbances then 
(4)    ( )
*
0
p p pp p
i ii i TT η = = +> 1Z π . 
The usual requirement for identifying the demand system in equation (3) still 
applies – that prices are exogenous which is usually thought to apply at the micro level 
in demand analysis. However, identifying the conditional demand system with 
endogenous conditioning of equations (3) and (4) together requires somewhat more if 
a selection issue arises, i.e. if  ( ) 0 , cov ≠ ik
p
i ε η . The stochastic specification of the 
error terms is assumed to be multivariate normal, with an  unrestricted variance-
covariance matrix. Multivariate normality is assumed on the grounds that it is quite 
conventional, allows a flexible correlation structure, and leads to a computationally 
tractable likelihood function. The resulting likelihood is a trivariate Probit selection 
model with three correlated endogenous variables (participation  in each transfer 
program) and two correlated (budget share) equations: 
(5)  ( ) ( ) 32 ,,    , , 
fsl wmt dcm
fsl dcm wmt m f m f fsl dcm wmt
fsl wmt dcm
L dd d ϕ ηη η εεϕεε η η η
+ ++
−−−
=∏ ∫∫∫ , 
where  φ2 and  φ3   are the bivariate and tri-variate Normal densities. The limits of 
integration are given by 
p p Z π , ∞ +   if 1 =
p T , or    ,   −∞
p p Z π if 0 =
p T , and 
otherwise+ ∞ −∞ , respectively. Estimation is  by Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood. 
 
25 See Hernandez and Pudney (2007).   24 
While it is possible to  rely purely on these distributional  assumptions, the 
context of our problem suggests some exclusion restrictions may be imposed for non-
parametric identification of the model. First and foremost, we exploit changes in the 
levels of entitlement and eligibility that have occurred over time, through reforms and 
imperfect indexation  over time,  which  might  induce changes in the levels of 
participation, given household characteristics.  The most important of these policy 
changes was the 1988 reform that removed eligibility to Free School Lunches and 
Welfare Milk Tokens entirely for the working poor but not for the non-working poor. 
Embedding a difference-in-differences design into a structural model in this way is 
essentially  a  form of grouped instrumental variables.  In addition  to the reform, 
imperfect indexation and real price changes, offer additional exclusions that can be 
thought of as over-identifying restrictions. 
A further restriction is suggested by the take-it-or-leave-it nature that nutrition 
programs typically have. Free School Lunches are available in only one quality, and at 
a given time and place. The demand for a transfer of this given (usually low) quality is 
likely to depend on household income since it seems likely that quality is a normal 
good: for a given quality,  as income rises from a low level the probability of 
participation is likely to rise because the desired quality level is likely to be above the 
offered quality level; but beyond the income level where desired quality is the same as 
the offered quality, further increases in income lead to a decrease in the participation 
probability.    That is, the relationship between free school lunch  participation  and 
income is likely to be non-monotonic. In the case of Free School Lunches we might   25 
proxy quality by price relative to the price of (market) food which varies over time.
26 
If the price of school lunches is high relative to the price of food in general then this is 
an indication of their higher quality, to the extent that the price reflects the costs of 
raw materials and other inputs.
27 We use an interaction between the quality of the free 
school lunch (proxied by price)  and a quadratic in log income to capture the likely 
inverted “U” shape relationship between the participation probability and income that 
arises because of the take-it-or-leave-it nature of the program.
28
Finally, it is important to note that it is a maintained assumption, as usual in 
demand analyses, that total expenditure is exogenous. It is useful to state why this is 
assumed and what the consequences are. Eligibility for Welfare Milk Tokens or Free 
School Lunches requires both household receipt of an associated cash transfer and 
children in the relevant age range. For the purposes of our analysis, we assume 
Welfare Milk Tokens  and Free School Lunches  are  available for those  who are 
eligible to the associated cash transfer according to the reigning rules, not only those 
  Note that our use of 
the QUAIDS model implies that the shares themselves depend on log price and on a 
quadratic in log income, but there is no role for an interaction term. 
 
26 The price is the average price observed in the data for those that buy school lunches within each 
region. In principle this price is fixed nationally although we do find that there is a small cross section 
variation, especially after the mid 1980’s. 
27 Over the time period considered here the real price of school lunches increased by 10%, while the 
real price of food fell by 13% and the real wages of unskilled workers remained approximately static. 
28 In addition, a further exclusion restriction is that benefit-year (April to March) dummies only enter 
into the program participation equation. This is in order to capture the effects of other changes in 
transfer programs, over and above entitlement value – such as administrative procedures. We would 
argue that these proxies for administrative changes should not affect the budget shares beyond their 
effect on participation and hence on the number of in-kind units received. For the budget share, month-
of-year dummies capture seasonality and a quadratic time trend is added to capture long run changes in 
spending patterns. Similar results were obtained from including a full set of month of year and calendar 
year dummies.   26 
who are in receipt of the cash transfer. Extending our model to explicitly incorporate 
participation in the associated  cash transfer  programs  would imply endogenizing 
income.
29 The consequence of this extension would be to complicate the model such 
that further identification assumptions or restrictions would be required  and  we 
consider this to be outside  of  scope  of  the present study.
30
4.3  Results and Discussion 
  Effectively, we are 
assuming that income matters for total expenditure but the sources of income do not. 
We assume that a dollar of welfare cash has the same effect, ceteris paribus, on total 
expenditure as a dollar of earnings or asset income. Thus, our analysis fully 
incorporates the effects of the cash transfer changes that occurred in 1988. 
Table 8 presents our preferred specification and needs some justification. We 
include the number of transfers in the budget shares and the values of entitlements in 
the participation equations since this was preferred over other combinations in a 
likelihood ratio test. The quadratic income terms in the participation equations were 
completely insignificant and left the remaining coefficients effectively unchanged so 
are omitted. We find that the level of entitlement
31
 
29 Our preferred estimates are presented in Table 8. In alternative specifications, the entitlement value 
of the cash  transfer was included as an explanatory variable in the associated nutrition program 
participation equations. The motivation was that a more financially attractive cash benefit may make the 
whole cash and in-kind transfer bundle more attractive. This would help identification to the extent that 
cash  entitlement  need not appear in the budget share equations. Coefficients on cash transfer 
entitlement turned out to be insignificant once nutrition program entitlement value was included. We 
take this as evidence supporting our simpler specification. 
 has a significant positive effect on 
30  Moreover, it seems unlikely that this is important for the estimates: although the assumption of 
exogenous total expenditure is rejected by Blundell et al (1993) and Browning and Meghir (1991), their 
results suggest only modest differences in estimates. 
31 Entitlement level is the product of the number of school age children (multiplied by five during term 
time, because there are five school days in a school week) and price. Since we already include the 
number of school age children our estimates imply that participation does not vary with quality except 
through the income interaction.   27 
participation in all cases. Income has a negative effect on milk transfer take-up and the 
effect on free school lunches is insignificantly positive.  The interaction between 
income and the real price of school lunches captures the idea that, if quality is a 
normal good, then at low levels of income an increase in quality will decrease take-up, 
but at high levels of income an increase in quality will increase take-up. Thus as 
income rises the interaction with lny should turn from positive to negative and this is 
reflected in the positive effect on the interaction between the quality and income and 
the negative effect of the interaction with the square of income. In fact our estimates 
imply that at levels of income in excess of £35 (which is close to the minimum in the 
data) the negative effect dominates implying that the quality of free school lunches is 
so low that even the poorest households would prefer a higher quality. Quality issues 
in milk are unlikely to be important in milk since it is only available in one quality. 
Not surprisingly, unlike in the free school lunch equation, price-income interactions in 
the milk program participation equations were insignificant and again their exclusion 
was unimportant. Finally,  the  correlations  between unobservables that  determine 
participations are not in the table, but are statistically significant, which supports our 
joint modeling of program participation.  
The coefficients on the number of free school lunches and the number of free 
pints of milk allow us to compute the extent to which these transfers are crowding out 
private expenditure of households. The mean food share of households not receiving 
Free School Lunches is 20% representing a real expenditure of £61.71 per week so a 
fall in the share of 0.006 represents a reduction in food expenditure of £0.19 per lunch 
(all figures are in 1992 prices), or about one fifth of the market value and somewhat 
smaller than both of our difference-in-difference estimates that exploited the 1988   28 
reform and school holidays.  Similarly, the mean milk share of households not 
receiving Welfare Milk Tokens is 1.60%, which represents an expenditure of £4.97, 
so reductions in the shares of 0.011 per  pint of nutrition program milk represent 
reductions in milk expenditures of £0.23 per pint, or about 70% of the market value 
which is somewhat larger than our difference-in-difference estimates.  
The figures in the text above are calculated at the mean of the data. In Table 9 
we present the calculated crowd out of private expenditures averaged over each 
observation in the dataset. Our estimated crowd-out for Free School Lunches is 15% 
of their value, while for milk the figures are both close to 80% of the value.
32
Our estimated elasticities, evaluated at mean income, are presented in Table 
10.  There are few estimates of  milk elasticities available for comparison in the 
literature but the results here compare closely with those from the British National 
Food Survey (National Food Survey Committee (1989)). But, unlike those, ours are 
well determined. 
  The 
cross effects make intuitive sense: one pint equivalent of Welfare Milk Tokens (Day 
Care Milk) reduces milk expenditure by £0.28 (£0.27) and induces non-milk food 
expenditure to rise by £0.06 (£0.07), while a Free School Lunch induces milk 
expenditure to rise by £0.08 and non-milk food expenditure to fall by £0.15. The Free 
School Lunch effect is small but the welfare and daycare milk effects are quite 
substantial – a high proportion of the transfer is crowded out by the household making 
countervailing expenditure changes.   29 
Compared to difference-in-differences, the structural estimates reveal greater 
relative crowd out from welfare milk tokens than  free school lunches. In both 
approaches we use eligibility reforms and regional school holiday variation for 
identification but assume that eligibility is random conditional on the covariates and 
that trends are common; while in the structural model we impose economic theory and 
distributional assumptions but explicitly allow for selection into program 
participation.  We prefer our structural model on three  grounds. Firstly:  that milk 
transfer crowd-out is found to be similar for reformed and non-reformed programs, 
which suggests we are not solely reliant on reform-driven variation for identification. 
Secondly: both regional vacation timing and the reform to free school lunch eligibility 
can be incorporated consistently and produce similar estimates. Thirdly: the structural 
model can identify agency under what seem like quite weak conditions. 
There is considerable agreement between the approaches. For example, 
welfare milk features in both structural and difference in difference models: in the 
former a token  decreases the  milk share (whose mean is approximately 1.5%) by 
0.1095 (Table 8) so 7 tokens per week for an average of 0.7 young children would 
reduce the share by about 0.5%; compared to an effect of 0.649% (Table 6, both 
control groups). Since the take-up rate for milk tokens is in the order of two thirds, a 
crude correction to make the ITT DD estimate comparable to the structural ATE 
would bring this 0.649 down to approximately 0.45 – just slightly smaller than the 
structural estimate.  Both models show crowding-out of transfers from the government 
 
32 We would expect the extent to which milk (tokens or liquid) crowds out spending on milk would be 
comparable with the effects of Food Stamps in US research. The Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2008) 
estimate is approximately 80%.   30 
indicative of altruism between parents and their children. The difference in differences 
suggested crowd-out is only slightly greater for welfare milk tokens than free school 
lunches, whereas the structural model suggests the difference in the extent of 
crowding-out  between the two programs  is somewhat  greater.  The congruence 
between structural and reduced form effects gives us confidence in the estimates of 
agency effects from the structural model. Here we find that the effects of daycare milk 
are essentially the same as welfare milk suggesting that agency issues are not 
important. 
5.   Conclusion 
This paper has been concerned with evaluating the impact of nutrition 
programs for households with children  on food expenditure. We have been 
particularly concerned about the extent to which the aim of these transfers can be 
undone by countervailing behavior of household members. The results suggest that 
there is the possibility of significant crowding-out. In the case of Welfare Milk Tokens 
we expected a high degree of displacement since the level of provision is large relative 
to typical needs: and we found that approximately three-quarters of the transfer is 
offset by reductions in milk expenditure. For Day Care Milk we found a similar effect 
despite the fact that it is less of a substitute for market milk (other household members 
cannot  consume  it) and the level of provision is low. The result that milk has 
essentially the same crowd out of private expenditure, regardless of whether it is given 
directly to children as Day Care Milk or to the mother as Welfare Milk Tokens, does 
not suggest the presence of agency problems. Moreover, as might be expected for Free 
School Lunches, a commodity which may well be a poor substitute for food purchased 
elsewhere, we found only a relatively small crowd out.   31 
The results are suggestive of strong altruistic connections especially between 
young children and their parents, which imply that public transfers to the parents have 
a  significantly tempered effect on the  children  themselves, particularly the young. 
However, the results are potentially important, and optimistic, for policy design.  They 
imply that in-kind transfers can be successful - provided one can limit crowd out of 
private expenditure by confining such policies to goods where there is no close market 
substitute. Agency issues in our specific example seem to be relatively unimportant. 
While our analysis is confined to in-kind transfers the issues that we address 
are relevant to other programs for households with children. Many cash transfers are 
intended to improve the welfare of one type of individual but are paid to another (for 
example, Child Benefit, a weekly lump sum, is paid to mothers in the UK, and is 
similar to Child Tax Credits in the US). The finding that agency problems are not 
large  for these in-kind programs provides some reassurance  over cash transfer 
programs.  
Finally, while our analysis has uncovered significant altruism but no 
significant agency effects, we are silent on the well-being of children over and above 
these effects. It would be useful to know what the impact of programs intended to 
improve childhood nutrition would be  on long term outcomes for children.  The 
effectiveness of such programs depends not only on how the delivery mechanism 
affects how much nutrition is delivered (which we address here) but also on the effect 
of a unit of nutrition consumed (which we cannot address with our data). Thus, our 
analysis is relevant to evaluating the delivery of the treatment, not the treatment itself.   32 
References 
Atkinson, A.B. and J. Micklewright (1983), “On the Reliability of Income Data in the 
Family Expenditure Surveys”,  Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
Series A, 146, 33-53. 
Banks, J.,  R.W.  Blundell and A. Lewbel, (1997), “Quadratic Engel Curves and 
Consumer Demand”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 79, 527-539. 
Bergstrom, Theodore C. (1989), “A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem—and 
Other Household Mysteries.” Journal of Political Economy, 97, 1139–59. 
Bhattacharya, J., J. Currie, and S.J. Haider (2006), “Breakfast of Champions? The 
School Breakfast Program and the Nutrition of Children and 
Families”, Journal of Human Resources 41, 445–466. 
Blundell, R.W., A. Duncan and K. Pendakur (1998), “Semiparametric Estimation of 
Consumer Demand”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 13, 435-461. 
Blundell, R.W., P. Pashardes and G. Weber (1993), “What Do We Learn about 
Consumer Demand Patterns from Micro Data?”,  American Economic 
Review, 83, 570-597. 
Browning, M. (1992), “Children and Household Economic Behavior”, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 30, 1434-75. 
Browning, M. and C. Meghir (1991), “The Effects of Male and Female Labor Supply 
on Commodity Demands”, Econometrica, 59, 925-951. 
Currie, J. (1997),  Welfare and the Well-being of Children: the Relative 
Effectiveness of Cash and In-Kind Transfers,  Harwood Academic 
Publishers, Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Mathematics series. 
Currie, J. and F. Gahvari (2008), “Transfer in cash and in kind: Theory meets the 
data”, Journal of Economic Literature, 46, 333-396. 
Deaton, A.S. and J. Muellbauer (1980), Consumer Behaviour, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Department of Social Security (1995), Social Security Statistics 1994, Newcastle 
upon Tyne: Department of Social Security, Analytical Services Division.   33 
Giles, C. and J. McCrae (1995), “The IFS micro-simulation tax and benefit model”, 
IFS Working Paper 95/19. 
Gruber, J. and D. Hungerman (2007), “Faith-based charity and crowd-oout in the 
Great Depression”, Journal of Public Economics, 91, 1043-1069. 
Heckman, J.J. (1979), “Sample selection bias as a specification error”, Econometrica, 
47, 153-162.  
Hoynes, H. W., and D. W. Schanzenbach  (2009), “Consumption responses to in-kind 
transfers: Evidence from the introduction of the food stamp program”, 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1, 109−139.  
Hungerman, D. (2009), “Crowd-out and diversity”, Journal of Public Economics, 93, 
729-740. 
Jacoby, H. G. (2000), “Is There an Intrahousehold 'Flypaper Effect'? Evidence From a 
School Feeding Program, Economic Journal, 112, 196-22. 
Johnson, P., G. Stark, and S. Webb (1990), “TAXBEN II: the New IFS Tax-Benefit 
Model”, IFS Working Paper 90/5. 
Kelmsley W., R. Redpath and M. Holmes (1980), Family Expenditure Survey 
Handbook, PRCS Social Survey Division, HMSO. 
Millimet, D.L., R. Tchernis, and M. Husain (2009), “School nutrition programs and 
the incidence of childhood obesity”, Journal of Human Resources, 45, 640-
654. 
National Food Survey Committee (1989), Household Food Consumption and 
Expenditure, HMSO, London. 
Pollak, R.A. and T. J. Wales (1995), Demand System Specification and Estimation, 
Oxford University Press. 
Hernandez, M., and S.J. Pudney (2007), “Measurement Error in Models of Welfare 
Participation”, Journal of Public Economics, 91, 327 – 341. 
Schanzenbach, D. W. (2009),  “Do School Lunches Contribute to Childhood 
Obesity?” Journal of Human Resources 44, 684–709.   34 
Tanner, S. (1998),  “How Much Do Consumers Spend? Comparing the FES and 
National Accounts”, in J. Banks and P. Johnson (eds), How Reliable is the 
Family Expenditure Survey? Trends in Incomes and Expenditures over 
Time, Institute for Fiscal Studies, Report 57. 
 
 
   35 
 
Table 1  Descriptive Statistics:  Means (standard deviations) 
       Households with children 
Time period  Variable  IS>0  FC>0  IS=FC=0 
Pre-reform 
Number of adults  2.09 (1.12)  1.95 (0.74)  2.22 (0.65) 
Number of children 0-4  0.64 (0.77)  0.64 (0.82)  0.53 (0.71) 
Number of children 5-15  1.26 (1.11)  1.44 (1.17)  1.23 (0.95) 
Proportion lone parent  0.32  0.26  0.04 
Free School Lunch receipt  0.40  0.47  0.02 
Welfare Milk Token receipt  0.37  0.34  0.02 
Day Care Milk receipt  0.14  0.11  0.07 
Post-reform 
# adults  1.75 (1.00)  1.92 (0.80)  2.15 (0.63) 
# children 0-4  0.72 (0.78)  0.62 (0.78)  0.58 (0.72) 
# children 5-15  1.16 (1.11)  1.49 (1.15)  1.17 (0.95) 
Proportion lone parent  0.50  0.31  0.05 
Free School Lunch receipt  0.31  0.09  0.01 
Welfare Milk Token receipt  0.41  0.04  0.01 
Day Care Milk receipt  0.11  0.06  0.02 
Note: IS>0 denotes Income Support receipt, FC>0 indicates Family Credit receipt and IS=FC=0 receipt 
of neither. 
 
Table 2         Expenditure Patterns Pre and Post Reform by Group (£ pw, 1997 prices) 
  Welfare program  IS>0  FC>0  FC>0  FC=IS=0 
Time period Children  all  0-4 only  5-16 only  All 
pre-reform 

















































Note: Eligibilities in the table are calculated conditional on the cash transfer receipt. A similar table 
where eligibility is conditional on transfer eligibility rather than receipt is available from the authors on 
request.   36 
Table 3  Cash Transfer Program Reform and Eligibility 
    Number of eligible households (percent of age group) 
    Pre-reform  Post-reform  Both 
Program  Childrens’ ages  Number  percent  Number  percent  Number  Percent 
IS receipt 
0-4 only  686  (16.3)  421  (14.7)  1107  (15.6) 
5-15 only  1399  (13.5)  597  (10.8)  1996  (12.6) 
0-4 & 5-15  628  (17.9)  315  (14.7)  943  (16.7) 
FC receipt 
0-4 only  94  (2.2)  74  (2.6)  168  (2.4) 
5-15 only  249  (2.4)  218  (3.9)  467  (2.9) 
0-4 & 5-15  122  (3.5)  115  (5.4)  237  (4.2) 
Note: Eligibilities in the table are calculated conditional on the cash transfer receipt. A similar table 
where eligibility is conditional on cash transfer eligibility rather than receipt is available from the 




Table 4  Program by Program Eligibility and Participation 
Number of households (row percent) 




No  17426  (97.4)  426  (2.4)  17888 
Yes  1521  (41.8)  2122  (58.2)  3643 




No  10016  (97.4)  268  (2.6)  10284 
Yes  603  (24.6)  1852  (75.4)  2455 




No  8140  (100.0)  0  (0.0)  8140 
Yes  3750  (81.5)  849  (18.5)  4599 
Total  11890  (93.3)  849  (6.7)  12739 
Notes: UK Family Expenditure Surveys 1982-92. The dataset comprises 29222 households with children 
from pooled cross-sections.  Free school lunch numbers are for households with school-age children 5-15. 
Welfare milk tokens and daycare milk numbers are for households with children 0-4. Eligibilities in the 
table are calculated conditional on the cash transfer receipt. A similar table where eligibility is conditional 
on cash transfer eligibility rather than receipt is available from the authors on request. 
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Number of programs received   





17071  (97.7)  391  (2.2)  7  (0.0)  0  (0.0)  17469 
6731  (70.1)  2757  (28.7)  100  (1.0)  13  (0.1)  9601 
314  (22.5)  691  (49.4)  393  (28.1)  0  (0.0)  1398 
72  (9.5)  226  (30.0)  300  (39.8)  156  (20.7)  754 
Total  24188  (82.8)  4065  (13.9)  800  (2.7)  169  (0.6)  29222 
Note: Eligibilities in the table are calculated conditional on the cash transfer receipt. A similar table 
where eligibility is conditional on cash transfer eligibility rather than receipt is available from the 
authors on request. 
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Table 6  Intention to Treat effects on budget shares (%) with cash transfer eligibility grouping 




(FCe > 0) 
Control 
(FCe =0)  γ  p-value  γ  p-value  Γ  p-value 
Children   
0-4 only 
Lose WMT  Keep WMT (ISe>0)  0.960  0.031  -0.472  0.000  0.488  0.000 
Lose WMT  Never WMT (ISe=0)  0.339  0.109  -0.247  0.914  0.092  0.093 
Lose WMT  Either WMT  0.649  0.007  -0.360  0.000  0.290  0.000 
Children   
5-15 only 
Lose FSL  Keep FSL (ISe>0)  0.230  0.460  1.757  0.254  1.987  0.409 
Lose FSL  Never FSL (ISe=0)  -0.056  0.732  2.612  0.001  2.556  0.005 
Lose FSL  Either FSL  0.087  0.757  2.185  0.000  2.272  0.002 
All 
Lose WMT/FSL  Keep WMT/FSL (ISe>0)  0.400  0.132  0.992  0.364  1.392  0.200 
Lose WMT/FSL  Never WMT/FSL (ISe=0)  0.180  0.196  3.634  0.000  3.815  0.000 
Lose WMT/FSL  Either WMT/FSL  0.290  0.057  2.313  0.000  2.603  0.000 
Note: FCe is Family Credit eligibility and ISe is income support eligibility computed on the basis of pre-reform criteria. DD indicate difference-in-difference 
estimates and associated p-values from separate budget share regressions on individual data. Controls for log income and its square are included. WMT 
denotes Welfare Milk Tokens, FSL is Free School Lunches, FCe is Family Credit receipt and ISe is income support receipt. The first three rows are estimated 
on households containing only pre-school children in order to focus on Welfare Milk Tokens. The middle three rows are estimated on households with only 




Effects of free school lunches on non-milk food budget shares (%) by 
school holidays 
   
Sample  Control  Treatment  Cash transfer eligibility 
  School day in:  School holiday in:  DD  p-value 
Free School 
Lunch eligible 
Scotland (Aug)  England/Wales (Aug)  0.00705  0.5445 
England/Wales (July)  Scotland (July)  0.02588  0.0609 
Both (everywhere)  Both (everywhere)  0.01646  0.3095 
 
  FSL Ineligibles:  FSL Eligibles:     
All school 
aged children  Holiday-term  Holiday-term  0.01662  0.6937 
Note: The sample includes households with children age 5-15 who are eligible for Free School Lunches. 
DD indicate difference-in-difference estimates and associated p-values from separate budget share 
regressions on individual data. These regressions include month and region effects, as well as household 
characteristics, and the coefficients above are from the month*region interactions. Family Credit eligibility 
is calculated on observed characteristics and pre-reform rules. The last row of the table represents both 
treatment groups together (holidays in any region) and both control groups together (school days in any 
region).   
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Table 8.     Expenditure Shares and Nutrition Program Participation: ML Estimates 
Dependent Variable  Budget Shares  Program Participation 
Category  Milk  non-milk food  free school lunch  day care milk  welfare milk 
tokens 
Intercept  10.8710  0.4130  6.0763  0.1988  0.1058  1.4436  1.1522  0.2095  2.2693  0.3611 
Program                 # free school lunches   0.0309  0.0025  -0.0060  0.0015             
                                 # day care milk pints   -0.1055  0.0246  0.0026  0.0014             
# welfare milk tokens  -0.1095  0.0030  0.0025  0.0019             
Entitlement value          0.5050  0.1293  0.2678  0.0662  0.2010  0.0706 
Prices & incomes                        Ln p(milk)  2.6988  0.5385                 
                                          Ln p(non-milk food)  1.5095  0.8147  0.6300  0.4475             
Ln y  -2.5662  0.1511  -0.9637  0.0690  0.0890  0.2668  -0.2275  0.0393  -0.2524  0.0772 
(Ln y)
2  0.1207  0.0145  0.0007  0.0064             
(Ln y)*lunch price          1.1653  0.2855         
(Ln y)
2*lunch price          -0.1943  0.0511         
Demographics                    # children 0-4  0.4209  0.0125  0.0752  0.0073  0.1715  0.0336  0.1249  0.0259  0.0684  0.0926 
# children 5-15  0.3431  0.0097  0.2125  0.0054  0.1164  0.0629  0.0171  0.0199  -0.0138  0.0280 
# adults  0.3219  0.0124  0.2659  0.0063  -0.0412  0.0351  -0.0122  0.0425  -0.1145  0.0577 
Other controls  R,M,t  R,M,t  R,B  R,B  R,B 
Notes:  Conditional (on nutrition program participation) Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System with homogeneity and symmetry imposed. See main text for tests of these 
restrictions. Mean log likelihood -3.1221. The budget share dependent variables milk and non-milk food are multiplied by 100 and 10 respectively. Asymptotic standard errors are in 
italics. The reference household type is headed by a lone parent, regardless of employment status. Other controls indicated in the table but not presented are (B) dummies for 12 
benefit-years, R for 10 regions, M for 11 months of year. t indicates the presence of a quadratic time trend, also parents’ marital and employment status interactions are included.   41 
Table 9  Estimated Crowd Out: Mean (standard deviations) 




Day-care milk  
(£0.33) 



















Table 10  Estimated Elasticities: Mean (standard deviation) 
  Milk  Food 
Milk Price  -0.1008  (0.0021)  0.0901  (0.0031) 
Food Price  0.0901  (0.0031)  -0.7355  (0.0146) 
Income  0.1162  (0.0225)  0.1789  (0.0197) 
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Appendix 
 
Q = question; I = instruction to interviewer. 
 
Q99: Have (any of) you (or your children under 16) had any free welfare milk during the 
past seven days ending yesterday? 
 
I99: Welfare milk is available for: 
i. Expectant mothers and all children under school age in families in receipt of 
supplementary benefit, housing benefit supplement, family income supplement or in 
special need because of low income. 
ii. An expectant mother who already has two children under school age, regardless of 
family income. 
iii. All but the first two children under school age in families with three or more children 
under school age, regardless of family income. 
iv. Handicapped children aged 5 to 16 who are not attending an educational 
establishment. 
 
Q100: Has (have any of) your child(ren) under 16 had any free school milk during the 
past seven days ending yesterday? 
I100: Free school milk is supplied to children up to approximately their seventh birthday 
at registered day nurseries, playgroups and state primary school or approved child minder. 
The amount is one third of a pint per day. For children with particular health problems, 
milk may be supplied up to their sixteenth birthday or the allowance may be more than 
one third of a pint. 
 
Q101: Has (have any of) your child(ren) at state school(s) had any school meals during 
the past 7 days ending yesterday? 
I101: Free school meals are supplied to children whose parents are on a low income. The 
conditions governing school meals vary from local authority to local authority.   43 
Figure 1  Free School Lunch receipt by group and calendar year: 






































Figure 2  Welfare Milk Token receipt by group and calendar year: 
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Figure 3a  Milk Budget Share by group and calendar year 
 
 
Figure 3b   Food Budget Share by group and calendar year 
 
 
 